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DITORIALhe  emergence  of  a  new  corona  virus—–MERS-CoV:
ind  sight  is  always  20/20
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ohe  discovery  of  the  novel  Middle  Eastern  Respi-
atory Syndrome  Corona  Virus  (MERS-CoV)  came  as
 surprise  to  most  people  including  physicians  [1].
ut it  was  not  a  surprise  to  the  infectious  disease
ommunity in  particular.  In  fact,  the  documenta-
ion of  the  epidemiology  of  infectious  outbreaks
s well  known  and  speculations  of  future  emergent
athogens do  exist  [2,3].  Despite  our  knowledge  of
he history  of  epidemics  and  pandemics  it  is very
ifﬁcult  to  prevent  such  adversities  [4].
Most emerging  organisms  responsible  for  out-
reaks  are  zoonotic  pathogens  to  start  with.  And
s elegantly  described  by  Pike  et  al.  they  transform
radually to  become  capable  of  infecting  humans
2].  Then  at  an  advanced  transformation  stage
uch pathogens  may  sustain  human  to  human  trans-
ission  capabilities  [2,5].  Some  of  these  zoonotic
athogens  are  not  capable  of  further  development
o become  a  pure  human  pathogen,  but  some  do.
he most  fascinating  of  all  is  the  human  immune
eﬁciency virus,  a  virus  that  has  mesmerized  sci-
ntists and  physicians  alike  for  at  least  the  past  30
ears [6].
Time and  again  we  face  the  same  scenario  with
merging  pathogens  and  for  respiratory  pathogens
hese scenarios  are  almost  identical.  The  identiﬁ-
ation  of  clustering  of  cases  of  unusual  respiratory
llness with  no  diagnosis  is  the  ﬁrst  indication  of  a
otential  outbreak.  Diagnostic  laboratories,  when
roperly equipped,  may  go  through  the  routine  list
f pathogens  with  no  diagnosis  [7]. It  may  take  sev-
ral cases  to  become  ill  before  a  novel  virus  can  be
dentiﬁed.  We  have  seen  this  all  too  frequently.  In
he past  decade  alone  we  have  witnessed  inﬂuenza
iruses H3N2  and  H1N1,  SARS-CoV,  inﬂuenza  H7N9
nd most  recently  with  MERS-CoV  emerging  from
he Arabian  Peninsula.  Dealing  with  these  emerging
o
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jiph.2013.06.002nfectious  agents  is  extremely  challenging,  not  only
rom the  medical  perspective,  but  also  from  the
conomical  and  the  psychological  impact  on  health-
are providers  and  patients  alike  [8].
The pressing  questions  that  rise  during  the  initial
tages of  such  events  include:  where  did  the  virus
ome from?,  how  were  patients  exposed?,  are  cer-
ain people  at  risk?,  how  is  it  transmitted?,  what  is
he incubation  period?,  for  how  long  will  patients
e infectious?,  is  there  a  risk  from  certain  animals
r other  reservoir?,  and  what  do  we  advise  relatives
f sick  patients?.  For  HCWs  one  of  the  commonest
ears is will  they  become  infected  and  if  so  will
hey infect  their  loved  ones  at  home?.  There  is
igh potential  for  chaos  and  healthcare  provider
urn out  as  well  as  psychological  stress.  During  the
ARS out  break  it  was  clearly  documented  that  such
tress led  to  work  absenteeism  which  allowed  for
urther difﬁculty  in  patient  care  [9,10].  In  such
ituations  it  is  most  difﬁcult  for  the  leadership  of
ealthcare  organizations  and  public  health  author-
ties within  the  countries  to  reach  a  balance  that
oes not  create  panic  among  the  people  but  at  the
ame time  provides  the  guidance  and  facilitates
he implementation  of  best  practices  for  preven-
ing disease  transmission  with  the  minimal  scientiﬁc
nformation  that  would  be  available  at  the  time.
The implementation  of  simple  standards  such
s hand  hygiene,  standard  precautions  and  special
solation  procedures  whether  contact,  droplet  or
irborne is  very  important  but  may  be  dependent
n very  minimal  scientiﬁc  basis  speciﬁc  to  the  con-
erned  pathogen  [11]. Further,  the  implementation
f these  precautions  may  very  well  be  out  the  reach
f many  facilities  in  developing  countries.  On  the
ther hand,  such  measures  may  be  the  only  avail-
ble mode  for  preventing  disease  transmission  and
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outbreak  escalation.  In  the  current  situation  with
the MERS-CoV,  close  to  a  year  after  the  identiﬁca-
tion of  the  ﬁrst  case  there  is  uncertainty  on  the
basic features  of  its  transmission.  As  of  the  prepara-
tion of  this  editorial  54  cases  have  been  identiﬁed,
among them  30  fatalities;  a  convincing  situation  for
unsustained  human  to  human  transmission.  Cases
have been  identiﬁed  in  KSA,  Jordan,  Qatar,  UAE,
UK, France,  Germany  and  most  recently  Tunisia.
The unavailability  of  a  serological  test  to  date  has
hindered  us  from  identifying  seroconversion  rates
among  asymptomatic  individuals  while  the  current
WHO guidelines,  which  understandably  requests  for
testing only  those  with  a  link  to  the  Arabian  Penin-
sula, has  also  delayed  our  ability  to  identify  cases
emerging  concurrently  from  other  countries  [12].
There  is  fear  of  the  current  virus  taking  a
more aggressive  path  and  emerging  into  a pan-
demic  virus.  Today  the  current  viruses,  whether  the
novel MERS-CoV  or  any  of  the  emerging  inﬂuenza
viruses, do  have  the  potential  capacity  to  evolve
into acquiring  the  ability  to  sustained  human  to
human transmission.  And  therefore,  we  will  con-
tinue to  hope  for  the  best  and  act  as  if  it  is  the
worst. In  doing  so,  the  infectious  disease  commu-
nity will  be  criticized  for  being  overstated  in  their
policies  and  take  the  heat  as  they  have  in  the  past
with similar  scenarios,  such  as  the  H1N1  pandemic
[13,14].  I just  hope  people  realize  that  hind  sight  is
always 20/20.
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